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Abstract Managing natural processes at the landscape
scale to promote forest health is important, especially in the
case of wildﬁre, where the ability of a landowner to protect
his or her individual parcel is constrained by conditions on
neighboring ownerships. However, management at a
landscape scale is also challenging because it requires
cooperation on plans and actions that cross ownership
boundaries. Cooperation depends on people’s beliefs and
norms about reciprocity and perceptions of the risks and
beneﬁts of interacting with others. Using logistic regression
tests on mail survey data and qualitative analysis of inter-
views with landowners, we examined the relationship
between perceived wildﬁre risk and cooperation in the
management of hazardous fuel by nonindustrial private
forest (NIPF) owners in ﬁre-prone landscapes of eastern
Oregon. We found that NIPF owners who perceived a risk
of wildﬁre to their properties, and perceived that conditions
on nearby public forestlands contributed to this risk, were
more likely to have cooperated with public agencies in the
past to reduce ﬁre risk than owners who did not perceive a
risk of wildﬁre to their properties. Wildﬁre risk perception
was not associated with past cooperation among NIPF
owners. The greater social barriers to private–private
cooperation than to private–public cooperation, and per-
ceptions of more hazardous conditions on public compared
with private forestlands may explain this difference.
Owners expressed a strong willingness to cooperate with
others in future cross-boundary efforts to reduce ﬁre risk,
however. We explore barriers to cooperative forest man-
agement across ownerships, and identify models of coop-
eration that hold potential for future collective action to
reduce wildﬁre risk.
Keywords Wildﬁre risk perception  Cooperation 
Landscape management  Nonindustrial private forest
owners  Multi-method design  Logistic regression 
Qualitative analysis  Social exchange
Introduction
Boundaries: ﬁres don’t understand them. We can’t
draw a line and say we did our part up to this point,
and now we are good…It’s just a bigger picture.
This forest landowner from eastern Oregon recognizes
that ﬁre occurs on a landscape scale. Although he believes
people need to manage ﬁre risk beyond their property lines,
he has not cooperated with any of his neighbors to address
hazardous fuel conditions locally. ‘‘We communicated with
them…but they have their own balance of what they want
to do,’’ he explained, referring to gulfs in values and pri-
orities for forest conditions and management. This land-
owner thins thickets of trees but leaves brush for deer
forage. He is concerned that one of his neighbors elimi-
nates too much habitat in his efforts to reduce fuel, while
another does nothing.
The importance of managing natural processes and
biodiversity at the landscape scale to promote the health
and productivity of forest ecosystems is widely recog-
nized (e.g., Lindenmayer and Franklin 2002). Doing so,
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ership boundaries—remains challenging. Different land
ownerships, public and private, are managed for different
goals using different actions, with differing ecological
effects (Landres and others 1998). In the case of ﬁre, haz-
ardousfuelreductionononeownershipcanreducetheriskof
ﬁre on neighboring lands. Similarly, suppression activities
on oneownership cancause ﬁre tobeexcludedfrom another
ownership, causing fuel buildups that can lead to uncharac-
teristically severe ﬁres having dire social, economic, and
ecological consequences. Where management activities
have ecological, economic, or social consequences beyond
ownership boundaries, and the efﬁcacy of one landowner’s
actions can be limited or improved by those of nearby
landowners, cooperation can be an important strategy for
achieving landscape-scale management goals (Yaffee and
Wondolleck 2000). Cooperation is also an alternative to
regulation for the management of common pool resources
such as forests; local residents who develop voluntary, self-
regulating management institutions may have greater
expertise and incentive for managing these resources effec-
tively than regulatory agencies (Ostrom 1990). Yet the
decision to cooperate with others hinges on a balance
between altruism and self-interest, and in this case, on
whether landowners are willing to accept the immediate
burdenofcooperatingwith others inexchangeforthe longer
term, but less certain, beneﬁt of buffering their properties
against ﬁre.
In this paper we explore the relationship between non-
industrial private forest (NIPF) owners’ perceptions of ﬁre
risk, including risk associated with conditions on nearby
forestlands (landscape-scale risk), and their decisions to
treat hazardous fuel in cooperation with others. Our study
area is the ponderosa pine (Pinus ponderosa) ecotype on
the east side of Oregon’s Cascade Mountains, where a
history of ﬁre suppression, grazing, and timber harvest has
led to a buildup of hazardous fuel and thus, ﬁre risk
(Hessburg and others 2005). Although this area is domi-
nated by federal lands, NIPF owners own 1/6th of the
forestland in the area. Much of their land borders or is near
federal land, creating a mixed-ownership landscape in
which their management practices affect the connectivity
of fuel, and potential movement of ﬁre, between federal
wildlands and populated areas (Ager and others 2012).
Given that ﬁre does not observe ownership boundaries,
and that fuel conditions on one ownership can affect ﬁre
risk on neighboring ownerships, we hypothesized that
owners who perceive a risk of wildﬁre to their properties,
and perceive that conditions on nearby forestlands con-
tribute to this risk, are more likely to cooperate with others
to reduce ﬁre risk across ownership boundaries. We
expected owners to be motivated by the rationale that
cooperation would enable them to accomplish fuel
reduction activities more efﬁciently together than alone.
Yet we also expected that social beliefs and norms about
cooperation and private property ownership would inﬂu-
ence owners’ decisions to treat fuel through cooperation
with others.
We investigated the relationship between risk perception
and cooperation through statistical analysis of mail survey
data. We used qualitative interview data to examine how
NIPF owners perceive ﬁre risk on their own properties and
on the wider landscape, and communicate and cooperate
with other private and public owners to address ﬁre risk.
Interview data also allowed us to explore the inﬂuence of
individual beliefs, social norms, and institutions on coop-
erative fuel treatments, and to identify potential models of
cooperation. After presenting our results, we discuss bar-
riers to cross-boundary cooperation in hazardous fuel
reduction and ways to potentially overcome them. The
ecological and socioeconomic conditions prevalent in our
study area are common throughout the arid West. Thus,
this case from eastern Oregon may shed light on opportu-
nities for managing ﬁre-prone forests using an ‘‘all lands
approach’’ elsewhere in the West.
Literature Review
Risk Perception
Risk perception, deﬁned as the ‘‘subjective probability of
experiencing a damaging environmental extreme’’ (Mileti
1994), is considered an important antecedent to mitigation
and adaptation behavior according to the natural hazards
literature (Paton 2003). In the case of wildﬁre and other
natural hazards, risk perception has been identiﬁed as a key
variable inﬂuencing mitigation behaviors such as taking
action to reduce hazardous conditions, preparing for a
hazardous event, or moving to a less hazardous area
(Dessai and others 2004; Grothmann and Patt 2005;
Amacher and others 2005; Niemeyer and others 2005;
Jarrett and others 2009; McCaffrey 2004; Fischer 2011;
Winter and Fried 2000).
People form perceptions of risk through interaction with
friends, peers, professionals, and the media on the basis of
norms, world views, and ideologies (Douglas and Wil-
davsky 1982; Berger and Luckmann 1967; Tierney 1999).
The process of coming to agreement on the causes and
consequences of risk, and acceptable levels of uncertainty
and exposure, is inﬂuenced by the level of legitimacy and
trust between people and institutions (Slovic 1999). Cog-
nitive biases (e.g., discounting future events, giving dis-
proportionate weight to vivid or rare events, and denying
risk associated with uncontrollable events) also play a role
in risk perception (Maddux and Rogers 1983; Slovic 1987;
Environmental Management (2012) 49:1192–1207 1193
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and objective knowledge (Hertwig and others 2004).
However, risk perception alone does not always compel
mitigation behavior. Other important variables include
believing one is capable of acting to effectively mitigate
risk, holding oneself responsible for one’s welfare, and
feeling sentimental attachment to a vulnerable community
or place (Paton 2003). Moreover, decisions to mitigate risk
occur under complex socioeconomic conditions that both
shape people’s vulnerability to risk (Slovic 1999), and
determine their efﬁcacy at addressing risk (Slovic 1987;
Maddux and Rogers 1983; Tierney 1999).
Cooperation
Cooperation refers to a spectrum of behaviors that range
from communicating with others about shared interests to
engaging in activities that help others, including sharing
resources and work (Yaffee 1998). The theory of cooper-
ation is based on the beneﬁts of reciprocity to participating
parties when combined efforts can achieve more than
individual efforts. Disciplines ranging from evolutionary
biology to political science have examined cooperation as a
response to adverse and unpredictable environments, and
as a strategy for hedging against and coping with envi-
ronmental risk (Andras and others 2003; Ostrom 1990;
Cohen and others 2001; Axelrod and Hamilton 1981).
Social conditions that foster cooperation among individuals
include the presence of common goals and motivations, a
perception of common problems (including risks), the use
of similar communication styles, high levels of trust, and
expectations and opportunities for frequent exchanges of
information and ideas (Yaffee 1998; Bodin and others
2006; Ostrom 1990). Policy environments, land tenure
arrangements, and power relations must also be conducive
to cooperation (Ostrom 1990; Bergmann and Bliss 2004).
Three important antecedents to cooperation, including
cross-boundary cooperation among private landowners, are
shared cognition, shared identity and legitimacy (Ricken-
bach and Reed 2002; Gass and others 2009). Shared cog-
nition refers to sharing a similar perspective or having
consensus on a problem or task (Bouas and Komorita 1996;
Swaab and others 2007). Shared identity means sharing
membership in a community or social group (Tyler 2002;
Tyler and Degoey 1995; Swaab and others 2007). Legiti-
macy is when people or organizations are viewed as fair
and capable and are empowered by others (Tyler 2006).
Social exchange theory provides a framework for
understanding when cross-boundary cooperation by NIPF
owners might occur. Social exchanges are interdependent
interactions among people that generate mutual beneﬁts
and obligations. One type, ‘‘reciprocal exchanges’’, con-
sists of interactions that lack terms or assurance of
reciprocation (Blau 1964). Reciprocal exchanges are an
informal form of cooperation that functions on the basis of
reciprocity rules (an action by one party leads to an action
by another party), beliefs (that people who are helpful now
will receive help in the future), and norms of behavior (that
people should reciprocate based on social expectations)
(Molm 1994; Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). Reciprocal
exchanges entail risk and uncertainty because they occur in
the absence of a contract. When they are successful, they
yield trust and commitment, which in turn lead to stronger
relationships (Blau 1964). When they are unsuccessful,
cooperation breaks down. In contrast, ‘‘negotiated
exchanges’’ are social exchanges that have known terms
and binding agreements to provide some assurance against
exploitation (Coleman 1990). Negotiated exchanges do not
entail as much risk or require as much trust as reciprocal
exchanges (Molm and others 2000).
The risks associated with cooperation increase when
‘‘mismatches’’ occur between the nature of the relationship
among the cooperators and the nature of the transaction
between them (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). For
example, when two landowners who have an interpersonal
relationship (one that depends on obligations, trust and
interpersonal attachment) engage in an economic exchange
(an exchange of goods or services), there is a mismatch. In
such cases, people who act to the economic beneﬁt of
others may feel betrayed if that economic beneﬁt is not
reciprocated, and may be reluctant to enter into another
such relationship. Thus, neighboring landowners who have
an interpersonal relationship and who cooperate in ﬁre risk
reduction activities—which are economic because they
entail investment of one person’s resources in the protec-
tion of another’s property—have a mismatch, exacerbating
the risks associated with cooperation. We return to these
observations in our Discussion.
Methods
Deﬁnitions
Our construct of wildﬁre risk perception among NIPF
owners includes concern about a wildﬁre occurring on
one’s land, and concern about hazardous fuel conditions on
nearby private or public land contributing to the chance of
wildﬁre on one’s land, based on Mileti’s (1994) deﬁnition
of risk perception as subjective probability. We also
included awareness of the ecological role of wildﬁre in
ponderosa pine forests, and past experiences with wildﬁre
on one’s property as elements of our risk perception con-
struct based on Hertwig and others (2004). For purposes of
our analysis, we deﬁne cooperation as jointly planning,
paying for, or conducting activities that reduce hazardous
1194 Environmental Management (2012) 49:1192–1207
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between NIPF owners and public agencies.
Data Collection
In September 2008 Oregon State University and Oregon
Department of Forestry funded and administered a mail
survey to owners of a random sample of NIPF parcels in
eastern Oregon’s ponderosa pine ecosystem. The goal of
the survey was to learn more about NIPF owners’ wildﬁre
management practices, constraints on ﬁre management,
and how public agencies could design better assistance
programs.
The survey sample was selected by casting random
points across a GIS polygon created using layers of pixels
that represent historical and potential ponderosa pine for-
ests (Grossmann and others 2008; Ohmann and Gregory
2002; Youngblood and others 2004) and an ownership
layer (Fig. 1). The NIPF polygon comprised approximately
1.2 million hectares, about 50 % of all NIPF land and 15 %
of all forestland east of the Cascade Range in Oregon,
which is consistent with other estimates of the proportion
of land in NIPF ownership in eastern Oregon (Oregon
Department of Forestry 2006). The point layer was joined
with a state tax lot layer obtained from the Oregon
Department of Revenue to create a list of owner names,
addresses and tax lot numbers.
The survey asked about owners’ past (2003–2008) and
intended future (2008–2013) hazardous fuel reduction
activities, including cooperation with public agencies,
nonproﬁt organizations, private consultants or other private
landowners. Survey questions also addressed owners’
goals, experiences with wildland ﬁre, concern about ﬁre
risk in general, concern about speciﬁc hazards and potential
losses, and demographic characteristics. Respondents were
asked to reference the parcel associated with the tax lot
number on their survey. The survey was reviewed by 20
natural resource professionals, landowners, and social sci-
entists and approved by the Oregon State University
Institutional Review Board prior to implementation.
The survey was administered to 1,244 owners using the
total design method (Dillman 1978): an announcement
card, followed ﬁve days later by the survey; a second
survey to non-respondents 2 weeks after the ﬁrst; and at
week four, a thank you card that also served as a ﬁnal
reminder to non-respondents. Of the 1,244 surveys mailed,
Fig. 1 Study area showing
nonindustrial private forest and
public ownership and case–
study locations
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123234 were disqualiﬁed, leaving 1,010 valid surveys. From
these, we received 505 valid responses, yielding a response
rate of 50 %. No follow-up survey of non-respondents was
conducted.
The survey respondents consisted mostly of retirement-
age males, similar to NIPF owners in the American West
(Butler and Leatherberry 2004), but more had obtained
bachelor’s degrees, earned above the national median
household income ($50 K), and were absentee (Butler and
Leatherberry 2004). Also, a high proportion had treated
their parcel to reduce the risk of wildﬁre compared to
owners in the West generally (Brett Butler, unpublished
National Woodland Owner Survey data 2006). They also
owned relatively large holdings compared to other owners
in the West (Butler and Leatherberry 2004). These dis-
parities reﬂect the sampling approach (based on forestland,
not forest owners), and the social and biophysical condi-
tions in eastern Oregon where land use rules set large
minimum tax lot sizes, and arid climate limits productivity,
favoring forestry and grazing over large areas. These and
other characteristics of the sample are presented in Table 1.
We conducted semi-structured key informant interviews
in 2007 and 2008 with a purposive sample of 60 NIPF
owners owning forestland in three watersheds in the study
area that are considered high priority for hazardous fuel
reduction (Oregon Department of Forestry 2006): the
Sprague, Upper Deschutes, and Upper Grande Ronde
(Fig. 1). We identiﬁed owners having diverse ﬁre experi-
ences, management intensities, and ownership character-
istics with help from local natural resource agencies and
organizations. Each interview included a walking tour of
the owner’s property and averaged two hours. Questions
addressed their management approaches, experiences and
concerns with ﬁre, ecological knowledge and values about
ﬁre and forest conditions, and perceptions of opportunities
and constraints for hazardous fuel reduction. Most inter-
view informants had treated some portion of their parcel to
reduce the risk of wildﬁre. Digital recordings of the
interviews were transcribed verbatim and entered into
Atlas.ti, a software program that aids qualitative data
analysis. The interview sample was similar to the survey
sample in terms of demographic characteristics.
Data Analysis
To analyze the mail survey data we used frequencies to
describe respondents’ perceptions of ﬁre risk and their
cooperationbehaviors,andlogisticregressiontoidentifythe
relationship between risk perception, and cooperation on
fuel reduction. We began the logistic regression analysis
with a manual backward stepwise regression of the cooper-
ation variables on the risk perception variables and a set of
demographic control variables, and then built ﬁnal models
with the variables that were relevant to the hypothesis.
Table 2 contains descriptions of the cooperation response
variables and risk perception explanatory variables.
To analyze the interview transcripts we followed a
standard protocol of qualitative analysis (Patton 2002). We
identiﬁed and coded quotations in the transcripts that pro-
vided evidence for how interview informants perceive ﬁre
risk, including the probability of ﬁre, the hazardous con-
ditions that contributed to the probability of ﬁre, and what
values they were concerned about losing in the case of ﬁre.
We also coded quotations that provided evidence for how
owners view the barriers and opportunities of cooperation.
We linked these quotations with additional codes and wrote
memos about how wildﬁre risk perceptions motivated
owners to cooperate with others.
Results
Risk Perception and Hazardous Fuel Management
We are always concerned about ﬁre. Our fear every
summer is where is the lightning strike going to be
and are we going to be able to survive the ﬁre? That is
one of the reasons we created ﬁre breaks throughout
the property, and because our neighbors didn’t have
any.
Comments like this one indicate that some landowners
interviewed were aware of ﬁre risk beyond their property
boundaries, and responded by treating fuel. Survey
responses corroborated this ﬁnding. 67 % of the survey
respondents said they were concerned about a ﬁre affecting
their property. A majority (53 %) were concerned about
conditions on nearby public lands contributing to the risk
of wildﬁre on their property. Interview informants articu-
lated similar concerns, although few were aware of which
Table 1 Characteristics of survey sample (n = 505)
Female (percentage) 20.4
Bachelor’s degree (percentage) 51.7
Earn at least U.S. median income of $50 K (percentage) 73.5
Age (mean) 63.1
Use parcel as primary residence (percentage) 25.5
Distance of parcel from primary residence in miles (median) 75.0
Most important management goal is ‘‘residence’’ (percentage) 20.0
Years parcel owned (mean) 21.7
Parcel acreage (median) 392.0
Ownership acreage (median) 540.0
Treated acres to reduce risk of ﬁre (percentage) 70.0
Acres treated (median) 20.0
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‘‘You want to see risk? There’s risk,’’ responded one
interviewee when asked for an example of hazardous forest
conditions. Like many owners we interviewed, he pointed
to land on the other side of his fence line, in this case
national forest land in the Sprague River Watershed. ‘‘Here
you can see where it is thinned and then it gets really thick;
that is a piece of government ground. That is the difference
between my place and the government ground; theirs is
jungle.’’ Figure 2 shows forest conditions we often
encountered across property lines owners shared with
federal land management agencies.
Some owners were also concerned about fuel conditions
on neighboring private lands, as evidenced in this comment
by another interviewee from the Sprague River Watershed:
‘‘That is an inferno waiting to happen…He’s endangering
my property, my structures, and also my forest’’. However,
owners were less concerned about conditions on nearby
private lands than on nearby public lands. Only 37 % of
survey respondents were concerned about ﬁre risk from
nearby private lands. Some interview informants believed
that most private owners managed their forests enough (i.e.,
thinned and harvested) that little fuel was left to be of con-
sequence. ‘‘They are logging the living daylights out of
that,’’ exclaimed one interviewee, referring to the sur-
rounding industrialownership.‘‘It’s going tobeﬁne foralot
of years.’’ Other interviewees were simply more forgiving
about the risk associated with private lands than with public
lands. One owner guessed that her neighbors ‘‘are doing
ﬁne…doing it about the same way we are: thinning, logging
it every few years…The cattle are keeping the brush down.’’
70 % of the survey respondents had treated portions of
their parcels to reduce the risk of ﬁre between 2003 and
2008. They used a range of forest management practices
that can reduce fuel, presented in Table 3. The median
treatment area was 20 acres (interquartile range = 1–120
acres). Many interviewees said that they treated their
properties to compensate for the lack of hazardous fuel
management by their neighbors. As one owner in the
Sprague River Watershed explained,
If we have a higher risk because of heavy fuel build-
up on adjacent land…we look at our management
philosophy a little bit differently. We would do more
in our cutting, more than we like…to keep a crown
ﬁre from spreading.
Indeed, in a different analysis of the survey ﬁndings we
found that owners’ concern about ﬁre risk, and concern
Table 2 Variables used in logistic regression tests
Variable Type Deﬁnition
Cooperated with public
agencies
Dichotomous
response
Worked with public agencies to plan, pay for, or conduct practices that can reduce hazardous
fuel on their parcels: 1 if yes; 0 otherwise
Cooperated with private
owners
Dichotomous
response
Worked with other private owners to plan, pay for, or conduct practices that can reduce
hazardous fuel on their parcels: 1 if yes; 0 otherwise
Willing to cooperate with
public agencies
Dichotomous
response
Willing to work with public land neighbors to reduce fuel with the expectation that
cooperation will fulﬁll at least one of the following conditions: (a) reduce treatment costs,
(b) increase acreage treated, (c) make more equipment available, (d) make more funding
available, (e) make more training and education available, or (f) provide an exemption
from legal liability for escaped ﬁres: 1 if yes; 0 otherwise
Willing to cooperate with
private owners
Dichotomous
response
Willing to work with private land neighbors to reduce fuel with the expectation that
cooperation will fulﬁll at least one of the following conditions: (a) reduce treatment costs,
(b) increase acreage treated, (c) make more equipment available, (d) make more funding
available, (e) make more training and education available, or (f) provide an exemption
from legal liability for escaped ﬁres: 1 if yes; 0 otherwise
Concerned about ﬁre
occurring on parcel
Dichotomous
explanatory
Five-point scale of concern about wildﬁre occurring on parcel: 1 if concerned or very
concerned; 0 if not at all concerned, slightly concerned or moderately concerned
Concerned about hazard on
nearby public land
Dichotomous
explanatory
Five-point scale of concern about conditions on nearby public land contributing to the
chance of wildﬁre on parcel: 1 if concerned or very concerned; 0 if not at all concerned,
slightly concerned or moderately concerned
Concerned about hazard on
nearby private land
Dichotomous
explanatory
Five-point scale of concern about conditions on nearby private land contributing to the
chance of wildﬁre on parcel: 1 if concerned or very concerned; 0 if not at all concerned,
slightly concerned or moderately concerned
Aware of local ﬁre ecology Dichotomous
explanatory
Agree with statement ‘‘wildﬁre can help maintain open, park-like conditions that are
characteristic of ponderosa pine forests’’: 1 if yes; 0 otherwise.
Experienced a ﬁre on parcel Dichotomous
explanatory
Experienced a wildﬁre on parcel, or lost trees of value, or lost structures, or lost a home to a
wildﬁre on parcel: 1 if yes; 0 otherwise
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risk explained their likelihood of treating fuel (Fischer
2011).
Risk Perception and Cooperation
Most owners worked either on their own or with family
members, or with private contractors to conduct forest
management activities. However, many had also worked in
cooperation with others. Between 2003 and 2008, 34 % of
the survey respondents cooperated with public agencies,
18 % cooperated with other private owners, and 15 %
cooperated with nonproﬁt organizations to plan, pay for,
and/or conduct practices that can reduce fuel (Table 4).
Interview informants provided examples of cooperative
fuel treatment, particularly with public land neighbors:
participating in ﬁre management planning with the Forest
Service and the Bureau of Land Management for lands
adjacent to their properties; communicating with agencies
about the need to reduce fuel along shared property
boundaries; coordinating forest thinning and brush-clearing
with treatments on adjacent public lands to widen fuel
breaks; and synchronizing prescribed burns with those on
adjacent public lands to take advantage of agency ﬁre
ﬁghters and equipment.
Interview informants cited fewer examples of coopera-
tion with private landowners. These included allowing
neighbors to graze livestock on their properties to reduce
grass and brush, and planning treatments along shared
property boundaries to create wider, shared fuel breaks.
More often they observed the use of new techniques or
equipment on each other’s parcels. A number of owners
said they had referred interested neighbors to their con-
sulting foresters or operators to request treatments similar
Fig. 2 Property boundary: private on left, public on right
Table 3 Management practices of sample (n = 505)
Management practice Percentage of respondents
who conducted practice on
their parcel between
2003 and 2008
Burned material in piles 65.5
Grazed livestock 65.5
Thinned by hand or chainsaw 64.6
Pruned or limbed up trees 60.9
Cleared around structures 50.2
Created fuel breaks 48.1
Made structures more ﬁre proof 42.1
Pulled plants, brush or trees by hand 41.0
Mulched, spread or left material in
the forest
38.3
Thinned with mechanized equipment 36.4
Mowed, crushed, ground or chipped 33.5
Applied herbicides 32.0
Harvested timber for proﬁt 28.7
Understory burned 21.8
Sold logs for proﬁt 19.9
Sold wood products for proﬁt 12.1
Planted ﬁre-adapted trees 11.1
Took material to landﬁll 7.5
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portion of the 41 % of survey respondents who had worked
with private contractors may have been inﬂuenced by, or
inﬂuenced, other private owners, an indirect form of
cooperation.
Owners expressed a greater willingness to cooperate
with other landowners in the future to reduce ﬁre risk than
they had in the past. Most survey respondents said they
would cooperate with both public owners (68 %) and pri-
vate owners (75 %) to reduce fuel in the future, especially
if it would release them from liability for ﬁres resulting
from escaped controlled burns, reduce their share of the
cost of treatments, or make more public funding available
to them for treatments (Table 5).
According to the logistic regression tests, perceived risk
explained cooperation between NIPF owners and public
agencies, but not cooperation between NIPF owners and
other private owners. Concern about a ﬁre occurring on
one’s parcel, and concern about conditions on nearby
public land contributing to this risk were both associated
(P B .08) with whether owners reported having cooperated
with public agencies in the past on forest management
actions that can reduce fuel. Whether owners were aware
of the historical role of ﬁre in ponderosa pine ecosystems,
and whether owners had experienced a ﬁre on their land
were also associated (P B .05) with whether owners
reported cooperating with public agencies in the past to
reduce ﬁre risk. Owners’ willingness to cooperate with
public agencies in the future to reduce ﬁre risk was also
explained by the risk perception variables; speciﬁcally,
whether owners were concerned about a ﬁre occurring on
their parcel (P B .05), were concerned about conditions on
nearby public lands and private lands (both at P B .05),
and were aware of the local ﬁre ecology (P B .05). None of
the risk perception variables were associated with whether
owners had cooperated with other private owners in the
past. Only awareness of the local ﬁre ecology was associ-
ated with their willingness to cooperate with other private
owners in the future (P B .01). P values and odds ratios for
the risk perception variables are presented in Table 6.I n
addition, two demographic control variables were signiﬁ-
cant in preliminary manual backwards stepwise regression
tests: living on one’s parcel and age were associated
(P B .05) with whether owners had cooperated in the past
and were willing to cooperate in the future with both public
agencies and other private owners, whereas parcel size,
ownership size, tenure length, income, education and
gender were not.
Our logistic regression test partially conﬁrmed our
hypothesis (owners who perceive a risk of wildﬁre to their
properties, and perceive that conditions on nearby forest-
lands contribute to this risk, are more likely to cooperate
with others to reduce ﬁre risk across ownership bound-
aries). All of the variables included in our risk perception
Table 4 Past cooperation in
forest management activities
(n = 505)
Arrangement Percentage of respondents
who used arrangement
Only on one’s own or with family members 35.0
With public agencies, other private owners or nonproﬁt groups 41.2
With public agencies (e.g. ODF, BLM, NRCS)… 33.8
With private forest owners (e.g. neighbors)… 17.8
With nonproﬁt groups (e.g. watershed councils)… 14.8
With private contractors 41.0
Table 5 Willingness to
cooperate with other owners in
the future (public or private) to
reduce ﬁre risk (n = 505)
Conditions under which respondents are willing
to cooperate with other owners
Percentage of respondents willing to cooperate
with other public or private owners under
condition
Public owners Private owners
Cooperation reduces liability 61.0 65.8
Cooperation reduces cost 53.9 58.6
Cooperation makes more public funding available 53.1 56.0
Cooperation makes equipment available 49.2 50.6
Cooperation increases acreage 49.2 49.6
Cooperation makes more training
and education available
39.0 38.8
At least one of the above 67.7 74.7
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123construct predicted past cooperation between NIPF owners
surveyed and public agencies, and most predicted future
willingness to cooperate with public agencies. In contrast,
none of the risk perception variables predicted past coop-
eration between NIPF owners surveyed and other NIPF
owners, and only awareness of the role of ﬁre in ecosys-
tems was associated with future willingness to cooperate
among them. These ﬁndings indicate that other important
inﬂuences on cooperation among private forest owners are
at work.
Barriers to Cooperation
Although many of the owners interviewed acknowledged
the potential beneﬁts of cooperation in fuel reduction—
particularly for achieving economies of scale in their
efforts—they identiﬁed numerous reasons for not cooper-
ating. Barriers related to patterns of rural social organiza-
tion were most commonly cited. ‘‘People in the timber
sector are in an isolated spot,’’ explained an owner of 2,500
acres in the Sprague River Watershed, referring to the
sparsely populated and mountainous landscape of Oregon’s
east side, which impedes interaction. ‘‘[They] don’t have
many neighbors [to cooperate with].’’ Furthermore, the
markets and other natural resource-based economic activ-
ities that once provided a basis for interaction and reci-
procity despite this topography are now in decline. An
owner of 10 acres who recently moved to Union County in
the Upper Grande Ronde Watershed explained:
When this place was small family ownerships pri-
marily there was more talk between people and more
helping each other out because they were all
managing the land. Now people aren’t really deriving
a signiﬁcant amount of their income off the land…So
they don’t tend to talk to each other or help each
other out much.
As a result of demographic change, many newcomers
own forestland primarily for privacy and solitude (Kendra
and Hull 2005) or recreation. The isolation such owners
seek counters interaction. ‘‘We’re like two separate little
icebergs…we may touch…but only by necessity…it’s why
we live out here,’’ explained an owner of 200 acres in the
Deschutes River Watershed. A high rate of absentee
ownership (74 % in our survey sample), often associated
with recreational use, is a barrier to developing the social
relationships upon which cooperation is predicated. Our
regression results indicated that owners who live on their
parcels were more likely to have cooperated with their
neighbors in forest management than those who did not.
In addition, gulfs in values, beliefs, and motivations
regarding the management of ﬁre risk, also attributable to
demographic change, were seen as barriers to cooperation.
Owners who manage for commodities or habitat tended to
view ﬁre as a historically important and persistent eco-
logical force. They believed hazardous fuel needed to be
managed to prevent ﬁre from being overly destructive, but
did not seek to eliminate ﬁre from the ecosystem. In con-
trast, owners who hold land primarily for residential rea-
sons tended to view ﬁre as a threat to their homes and
scenic views, deﬁning hazardous fuel as anything in the
forest that could carry ﬁre. Differing perceptions of ﬁre and
fuel led to conﬂicting approaches to forest management.
For example, the owners of a 200-acre parcel in the Des-
chutes River Watershed selectively treated the most
Table 6 Logistic regression predicting inﬂuences on cooperation (frequencies in parentheses)
Dependent variables
Cooperated with
public agencies
(33.9)
Cooperated with
private owners
(17.8)
Willing to cooperate
with public agencies
(67.7)
Willing to
cooperate with
private owners
(74.7)
Independent variables P Exp(B) P Exp(B) P Exp(B) P Exp(B)
Concerned about ﬁre occurring on parcel (67.3) .012 1.941 .815 .935 .048 1.638 .218 1.387
Concerned about hazard on nearby public land (53.5) .068 1.559 .311 1.335 .000 2.810 .214 1.396
Concerned about hazard on nearby private land (37.4) .558 .867 .795 .928 .026 .551 .203 1.447
Aware of local ﬁre ecology (65.5) .049 1.621 .240 1.402 .005 1.959 .010 1.903
Experienced a ﬁre on parcel (39.0) .001 1.987 .659 .893 .430 .834 .890 1.035
Constant .000 .130 .000 .175 .662 .893 .282 1.336
Model
v
2 = 31.194,
Nagelkerke
R
2 = 0.099
Model
v
2 = 5.728,
Nagelkerke
R
2 = 0.021
Model v
2 = 29.973,
Nagelkerke
R
2 = 0.098
Model v
2 = 17.278,
Nagelkerke
R
2 = 0.062
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123hazardous fuels in order to preserve wildlife and scenic
beauty, differentiating themselves from their neighbors
who razed all vegetation (apart from large overstory trees)
within a 150-yard radius of their future home.
We understood their ﬁre concerns, but we were also
very concerned about how much they cleared out of
the winter forage for the deer…We don’t want to see
our forests be safe for wildﬁre but good for nothing
else.
Conﬂict was especially apparent around ﬁre treatments
(conducting controlled burns, burning slash piles, and
allowing naturally ignited ﬁres to burn on one’s property).
Some interviewees viewed ﬁre as a tool for reducing risk
associated with brushy, overstocked stands; others viewed
ﬁre as the risk itself. An owner of 10 acres in the Sprague
River Watershed who managed primarily for habitat had
permission to clear and burn brush on the property of his
absentee neighbor. However, another neighbor with less
risk tolerance stymied his efforts. ‘‘We had good conditions
for burning,’’ he explained. ‘‘There were still snow drifts!
Then these neighbors noticed what I was doing, got on the
phone and threatened legal action. One guy threatened to
kill me because they were so scared…And if you drive
back there now you will see how much fuel there is; it’s
scary.’’
Conﬂicting values and goals relating to ﬁre risk also
impeded cooperation between NIPF owners and public
land management agencies. An owner of 2,500 acres in the
Sprague River Watershed was disappointed about a pre-
scribed burn he had jointly conducted with the Forest
Service, and attributed the problem to differing scales of
risk tolerance. He believed the Forest Service was com-
fortable losing more trees in the burn than he was:
They were comfortable with a hotter controlled
burn…than I was used to…For them this kind of
mortality is nothing. They are dealing with thousands
of thousands of acres. But when you [have] a limited
number of acres, mortality has a different meaning.
Social norms about private property ownership and
appropriate behavior towards neighbors were also identi-
ﬁed by owners as constraints to cooperation, despite con-
cerns about hazardous fuel conditions on neighbors’ lands.
‘‘I kind of try to hint to them,’’ said one interview infor-
mant, when asked why he hadn’t encouraged his next door
neighbor to address hazardous fuel on his property. ‘‘But
that is about as far as you can go because people are set in
their ways.’’ The owner of 1,000 acres in the Upper Grande
Ronde River Watershed was more direct: ‘‘If you want to
have good neighbors you don’t mention things like that.’’
Social norms about reciprocity, including the age-old
challenge to collective action, free-ridership, also worked
against cooperation. ‘‘The trouble with our society,’’
explained an owner in his 80s who controls hazardous fuel
on his property despite being handicapped ‘‘is that one
person can do the work…and other people will take the
beneﬁt.’’ In other words, if your neighbors reduce fuel on
their properties, the risk to your property will be reduced
without you having to do anything.
Owners were also concerned about potential risks to
their autonomy as private property owners associated with
participating in formal cooperative groups. For example, an
owner of 650 acres in Klamath County recounted,
I have seen people—good friends—who aren’t
speaking to each other today because they are in a big
old group…It’s no longer: ‘Hey, Joe, come on over
and help me ﬁx my irrigation and I will come help
you ﬁx yours.’ It’s: ‘No I can’t come over because
you have an inch more water than I do, and I don’t
want to sue you about it.’—I don’t want to get into no
organization.
Owners were also worried about participating in formal
groups that include public agencies because of bureaucratic
or regulatory burdens that might be imposed on them, and
the discomfort of unequal power relationships. An owner
of 200 acres in the Deschutes River Watershed, who had
experienced frustration cooperating with federal agencies
on fuel reduction and ﬁsh passage activities, explained: ‘‘it
doesn’t feel good when you are feeling the heavy hand of
government coming in saying you shall do this!’’ Never-
theless, about half of survey respondents declared mem-
bership in formal, natural resource-related groups
(Table 7).
Finally, some owners mentioned laws that counter
cooperation. The risk of being legally liable for ﬁres or
injuries resulting from negligent conditions or activities on
one’s property discourages many owners from cooperating
on fuel reduction work. ‘‘The problem is the law and the
way liability is written,’’ explained one owner. ‘‘Nobody
wants to be responsible.’’
Opportunities for Cooperation
We asked interviewees to describe cooperative arrange-
ments for fuel reduction that would be amenable to them,
based on their observations or experiences, and grouped
their responses into three informal and three formal models
that we then named.
In the informal, ‘‘over the fence’’ model, interviewees
described landowners observing each other’s activities and
doing something similar, or encouraging other landowners
(often public agencies) to do more. Interviewees also
suggested that owners could also jointly identify an issue
that affects them and address it together (e.g., creating a
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123fuel break). In the informal ‘‘wheel and spoke’’ model,
contractors and other natural resource professionals help
multiple nearby landowners learn indirectly from each
others’ experiences, leverage ﬁnancial resources, and
access markets and fuel reduction services, without nego-
tiating terms of cooperation among the landowners
involved. In the ‘‘local group’’ model, interviewees
described local change agents creating a forum in which
landowners come together to address a common problem
(e.g., the accumulation of hazardous fuel on nearby public
lands). This informal process can lead to communication,
cooperation, learning, and eventual leadership among
members of the group. A number of interviewees claimed
that informal models of cooperation are more effective than
formal models because they don’t impose terms or require
reciprocation, which can create adversarial relationships by
establishing expectations.
Other landowners interviewed believed formal models
of cooperation were more efﬁcient and productive than
informal models. In the ‘‘agency-led’’ model, interviewees
described local natural resource management agencies
providing education, technical, or ﬁnancial support to help
landowners learn from each other and interact around
management activities; or, public funds so that landowners
can implement fuel reduction themselves. In the ‘‘collab-
orative group’’ model, participants commit to a process and
a product, are organized by a coordinator, and are guided
by policy documents. Few owners had experience with
formal ‘‘landowner cooperatives’’. However, some pro-
posed this model whereby groups of landowners would
pool harvests and develop contracts with processers,
working through a common contractor to increase their
leverage in marketing biomass and small-diameter logs.
Discussion
Cooperation is predicated on the beneﬁts of reciprocity.
People’s perceptions of risk can determine how they weigh
the beneﬁts and costs of working with others. This study
ﬁnds that the majority of NIPF owners in Oregon east of
the Cascade Mountains are concerned about ﬁre risk to
their properties, and beyond their property boundaries at a
broad scale. Those who have cooperated with others in
forest management activities that can reduce hazardous
fuel are in the minority, however. Concern over ﬁre risk did
not appear sufﬁcient to warrant cooperation with other
private landowners in particular. Of course, some owners
may lack concern about forest conditions on other private
properties; a smaller proportion of owners were concerned
about hazardous fuel conditions on nearby private lands
than on public lands. And, some owners felt protected by
heavy management on nearby private ownerships, espe-
cially industrial holdings. Nevertheless, roughly one-third
of owners were concerned about the ﬁre risk associated
with other private ownerships, and the majority were
willing to cooperate with other private owners in the future
to mitigate that risk. That they have not acted on their
concern in the past by trying to inﬂuence fuel conditions
around them through coordinated planning and treatments
with neighbors highlights the importance of other forces
that work against cooperation. Here we draw on the liter-
ature presented earlier in this paper to discuss possible
reasons for the disjuncture between NIPF owners’ ideals
and behaviors regarding cooperation.
Shared Cognition
Shared cognition is an antecedent to cooperation because it
reduces the risk of participation. When parties to a col-
lective effort perceive consensus among group members
about the nature of the problem being addressed, the goals
of the effort, and their commitment to the group, they are
less likely to defect (Bouas and Komorita 1996; Swaab and
others 2007). Although most NIPF owners surveyed per-
ceived ﬁre risk, it was clear in interviews that they did not
hold common perceptions of wildﬁre, risk, or hazardous
fuel. This lack of perceived consensus around the con-
structs of risk and hazard may hinder joint planning and
implementation of fuel reduction activities. Some owners
Table 7 NIPF organizational
membership (n = 505)
Types of organizations Percentage of
respondents who
said they belonged
Forestry organizations (OSWA, Society of American Foresters, etc…) 14.4
Fire ﬁghting organizations (e.g. Forest Protective Associations) 18.4
Outdoor organizations (hunting clubs, ﬁshing clubs, etc…) 24.5
Environmental organizations (Sierra Club, The Nature Conservancy, etc…) 18.8
Property or landowner’s association 16.2
Other similar organizations 4.6
An organization in at least one of the above categories 52.1
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and goals regarding forest conditions and perceptions of
ﬁre hazard and risk. However, awareness of ﬁre as an
important local ecological process was a predictor of
willingness to cooperate with other private and public
forest owners, suggesting that owners who share this view
are more likely to cooperate.
Social exchange theory suggests that without shared
beliefs about the probability and nature of ﬁre risk, hazard,
and the risk-reducing beneﬁts of cooperation, owners may
face difﬁculty rationalizing efforts to engage in potentially
burdensome social relationships (Cropanzano and Mitchell
2005). This observation echoes what scholars of coopera-
tion in the context of natural resources have argued:
without a vision of a common problem or a common
future, there is little reason to work together (Ostrom 1990;
Yaffee 1998). Other studies of private forest owners have
reached similar conclusions about the relationship between
congruency of perceptions, attitudes and values, and joint
planning (Rickenbach and Reed 2002; Jacobson and others
2000; Gass and others 2009).
Group Membership
The constraints to cooperation that NIPF owners described
in interviews were predominantly related to social organi-
zation: spatial isolation, a dearth of integrating economic
activities, and social norms that inhibit communication and
reciprocity among neighbors about fuel reduction. Survey
ﬁndings that three-quarters of owners do not live on their
properties provide additional evidence that social organi-
zation is a constraint on cooperation. Rural sociologists
documented early on how topographical relief and spatial
isolation inﬂuence social organization, and how resulting
social relations affect the development of sociability (Field
and Luloff 2002). Rural residents in eastern Oregon are
spread out and isolated from each other. Interview infor-
mants perceived this isolation as an impediment to socia-
bility, and in turn, cooperation.
Owners described the deterioration of rural, natural
resource-based economies as a barrier to cooperation.
Although formal cooperatives have never been pervasive
among NIPF owners in the West (Kittredge 2005), agri-
cultural cooperatives have served the practical need of
connecting isolated rural residents with external markets,
political processes, and each other (Hobbs 1995). With the
decline in timber, cattle and other commodity markets, the
basis for interaction and reciprocity among rural land-
owners in eastern Oregon has become scarce. Moreover, as
communities of place are being incorporated into wider
market economies and supplanted by social networks that
are not geographically based, people may be less inclined
to rely on local residents and resources (Brown 1993).
Some theories suggest that less bounded contexts dis-
courage cooperation because individuals are less likely to
anticipate reciprocity due to remote relationships (Cohen
and others 2001).
The demographic change associated with this shift in the
rural economy may be further alienating landowners. In
some areas of Oregon’s east side, afﬂuent, retired, and
otherwise mobile urbanites have migrated to rural areas for
their amenities, bringing new values and expectations for
land that can come into conﬂict with those of locals (Egan
and Luloff 2000). The more recent rise of property indi-
vidualism (Singer 2000) and increasing focus on privacy
among forest owners (Butler 2008) also run counter to
cooperation. Landowners’ fears of losing autonomy or
control of their properties have been well-documented
(Ellefson 2000; Fischer and Bliss 2009). For some, sharing
information or inviting people over to discuss forest con-
ditions and management may contradict values for privacy.
Even poking one’s head over a fence to comment on
conditions about which one is concerned is an invasion of
privacy, as evidenced in the adage ‘‘good fences make
good neighbors.’’
Without membership to a common community or social
group, landowners lack the structural and cultural basis for
developing norms of reciprocity. Without interaction, they
lack capacity to communicate and social mechanisms for
developing trust among individuals. These are key condi-
tions for cooperation (Ostrom 1990; Yaffee 1998; Tyler
and Degoey 1995). Lack of group identity not only reduces
interaction among landowners, it may also cause the lack
of shared cognition about wildﬁre risk that owners said
make cooperation difﬁcult.
Legitimacy
Although we found that some cooperation among private
forest owners and public agencies occurs, many owners we
interviewed reported cumbersome bureaucratic processes,
corrosive expert-lay person relationships, and a lack of
trustworthy leadership in natural resource management
efforts that involved public agencies, which discouraged
them from cooperating. Other research has shown that
NIPF owners’ concerns about allowing government rep-
resentatives onto their property, and agreeing to accept
agency assistance lead to struggles over private property
rights and undermine cooperation (Fischer and Bliss 2009).
These concerns arise from owners’ perceptions of the
legitimacy of public agencies. If people view an institution
as legitimate they develop a voluntary sense of obligation
to obey decisions, follow rules, or abide by social
arrangements rather than doing so out of fear of punish-
ment or anticipation of reward (Tyler 2006). This feeling of
obligation is essential for successful cooperation.
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Survey results indicated that cooperation in ﬁre hazard
reduction does not occur frequently among private owners,
yet many of the owners we interviewed said they com-
municated and cooperated frequently with other owners to
address other land management problems. This discrep-
ancy provides evidence that cooperation on fuel reduction
depends on the beneﬁts of social exchange outweighing the
costs. In reciprocal social exchanges, the risk of betrayal is
high (Cropanzano and Mitchell 2005). The potential for
misunderstanding or failure to meet expectations of reci-
procity may explain why owners infrequently cooperated
with each other, despite a future willingness to do so.
Perhaps some forms of cooperation—such as moving cattle
and equipment onto each other’s property, and suppressing
ﬁres that have ignited—have beneﬁts that outweigh the risk
and inconvenience of working together. In contrast, the
beneﬁts of cooperation in fuel reduction are less certain
given the mismatch in the nature of the transaction. Fur-
thermore, it may be easier for parties to agree about things
like relocating cattle and suppressing wildﬁres (shared
cognition), than about ﬁre risk mitigation, which invokes
judgments about how well people manage land and protect
others from risk.
Although there are substantial risks associated with
cooperation between NIPF owners and public agencies,
these social exchanges are generally negotiated, with both
parties agreeing to a set of rules regarding commitments
and expectations. In addition, substantial incentives exist
for private–public cooperation, for example, when federal
agencies offer cost-share monies, administrative and tech-
nical support, and other opportunities. In contrast, few
policies or programs encourage or reward cooperation
among private owners. These factors may help explain why
owners have cooperated more frequently with public
agencies than with each other.
Models for Cooperative Wildﬁre Risk Management
The fact that so many owners expressed a willingness to
cooperate with other private and public owners in the
future despite limited past experience and recognized
constraints; and the fact that about half already belong to
organized, natural resource-related groups, suggests the
potential for cooperation in landscape-scale forest man-
agement. Perceived ﬁre risk alone may not compel owners
to cooperate, but other policy and institutional incentives
might. Interview informants identiﬁed a range of potential
formal and informal models for cooperation. The tension
between the informal and formal models lies in the need for
ﬂexible, low-pressure arrangements as well as coordination
and efﬁciency. Some owners were willing to cooperate on
an ad hoc basis; others wanted cooperation to be formally
organized so that it would be efﬁcient and ensure a beneﬁt.
Owners suggested that among neighbors, informal models
may be preferable because they are less likely to make
people feel rigid and defensive. Although owners described
‘‘over the fence’’, ‘‘wheel and spoke’’ and ‘‘local group’’
models, we found only a few examples of these models
operating in the context of fuel reduction in our study.
Despite owners’ beliefs about the importance of coop-
eration, and in light of the apparent lack of cooperation
among owners, a less risky approach to cooperation among
neighboring landowners may be one in which fuel reduc-
tion occurs through formal institutions (Cropanzano and
Mitchell 2005). For example, the high cost of removing
woody biomass and small-diameter logs, and lack of
ﬁnancial assistance and markets for this material are
commonly identiﬁed barriers to fuel reduction (Fischer
2011). Formal institutional arrangements that enable
owners to jointly apply for cost-share funds, coordinate
treatments, and collectively offer biomass to the market
could increase the economy of scale of management
activities (Goldman and others 2007). Owners also identify
liability and free ridership as drawbacks of cooperative fuel
reduction. Formal institutions that coordinate management
actions and pool risk can offer protection against liability
and other risks associated with working with others (Am-
acher and others 2003).
Evidence exists for the emergence of new institutions
that may offer an alternative path to addressing ﬁre risk in
Oregon and elsewhere in the western United States. Local
collaborative institutions can provide an organized process
for increasing the efﬁciency and focus of collaborative
efforts without the binding terms that seem to put NIPF
owners on edge. For example, Community Wildﬁre Pro-
tection Plans (CWPPs), established under the Healthy
Forest Restoration Act, are tools for involving communities
in ﬁre risk mitigation on federal and nonfederal lands. They
are funded by states but developed and implemented
locally. While CWPP planning and implementation efforts
don’t always reach beyond wildland-urban interface (WUI)
boundaries and engage rural forestland owners, they have
brought together many stakeholders and built relationships
among community members around the issue of ﬁre risk
(Jakes and others 2007).
In California, Fire Safe Councils (that implement
CWPPs in that state) have been recognized for their ability
to promote innovative ﬁre mitigation activities and build
social capital in WUI communities (Everett and Fuller
2011). In Oregon, the nonproﬁt group Sustainable North-
west is working with landowner associations to expand
processing facilities and develop merchandising yards for
small-diameter wood, and to promote woody biomass
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tive institutions such as these create the opportunity for
frequent and sustained interaction among landowners
having diverse motivations and values, a necessary foun-
dation for building shared cognition, norms of reciprocity,
and in cases where public agencies are involved, legiti-
macy (Bodin and others 2006).
OthercooperativemodelsthatcouldinvolveNIPFowners
include The Nature Conservancy’s Fire Learning Network,
and the U.S. Forest Service’s Collaborative Forest Land-
scape Restoration Program (CFLRP). Fire Learning Net-
works are regional groups that bring together public
agencies, tribes, and municipal governments (though not
speciﬁcallyprivateforestowners)toplanandcoordinatefuel
reductionandforestrestorationactivitiesacrossownerships.
The CFLRP provides funding to local collaborative groups
to plan science-based, economically viable fuel reduction
and ecological restoration activities on select national forest
lands. Although focused on federal lands, these efforts may
be attractive to private forest owners if they help reduce the
costsof,orcreatereturnson,treatmentsonotherownerships,
ordecreasethelegalrisksassociatedwithtreatmentsthrough
Memorandums of Understanding and formal partnerships.
Future research could explore such models and the oppor-
tunities they offer for collective action for landscape-scale
ecosystem management across ownership boundaries.
Conclusion
In articulating his vision for America’s forests, U.S. Sec-
retary of Agriculture Tom Vilsack has emphasized an ‘‘all
lands approach’’ to forest restoration that calls for collab-
oration in undertaking landscape-scale restoration activi-
ties. Cooperation across ownership boundaries in ﬁre
prone, mixed-ownership forest landscapes is desirable yet
challenging. Most of the NIPF landowners interviewed and
surveyed for this study were concerned about ﬁre risk on
their lands and hazardous fuel conditions on the properties
around them (and on public lands in particular), and treated
fuel on their properties to reduce this risk. Although NIPF
owners indicated a substantial willingness to cooperate
with others on fuel reduction activities in the future, their
past behavior demonstrated limited cooperation. Perceived
risk of ﬁre occurring on one’s property, and from nearby
public forestlands were predictors of cooperation in fuel
reduction with public land management agencies. Risk
perception was not associated with cooperation among
private landowners. The availability of funding and tech-
nical assistance from public agencies to help support fuel
reduction on private lands, the greater social barriers to
private–private cooperation than to private–public coop-
eration, and perceptions of more hazardous forest
conditions on public lands relative to private lands may
explain this difference.
Interview data suggest that socialvalues and norms about
property ownership work against cooperation, especially
amongNIPFowners,evenwhentheyperceiveariskofﬁreto
their properties. Nevertheless, cooperation does occur
among private owners in arenas other than fuel reduction—
and it may occur indirectly through third parties, such as
privatecontractors.Furthermore,ownerssaytheyarewilling
to cooperate with one another in the future. Thus, given the
beneﬁts of cooperation for landscape-scale natural resource
management, new institutional models of cooperation to
manage landscape-scale ﬁre risk may hold promise.
From a policy standpoint, building a common under-
standing of ﬁre risk among landowners, including ﬁre risk
on lands beyond their own property boundaries, may
increase the likelihood that landowners will cooperate with
others to reduce hazardous fuel. Promoting this awareness
among landowners who reside on their properties may be
particularly effective given the positive association
between residing on one’s parcel and cooperation. Never-
theless, in the absence of policies and institutions that
improve the balance between the costs of cooperation and
the beneﬁts of protecting one’s property from ﬁre, coop-
erative landscape-scale management of natural hazards
across ownership boundaries will be limited.
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